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SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS

IV.

RULE 10b-6

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has promulgated certain rules designed to check manipulative acts in the securities market.)
The primary antimanipulative provision through which the SEC regulates
the transactions of participants in a distribution of securities is Rule 10b6.2 This Rule generally prohibits certain persons,3 who participate in the
distribution of securities, 4 from directly or indirectly bidding for or purchasing, or inducing others to bid for or purchase, securities of the same
class and series as those distributed until the distribution is completed.5
The Rule also enumerates eleven transactions that are excepted from its
coverage.'
transactions. In one of the transactions, directors of the subsidiary had caused the corporation
to make loans to its corporate parents. Id. at 662. The plaintiffs claimed that the loans were
advanced in violation of a prospectus statement and that this fact and the fact that the loans
were for far less than fair consideration were not disclosed. Id. at 664. The complaint did not
allege that the terms of the loans had not been disclosed, but only that the terms were unfair
and that the loans were inconsistent with company policy as stated in the prospectus. Id. at
664-65. The court held that since the shareholders were not misled as to the actual terms of
the loan transactions, mere nondisclosure of "unfairness" did not rise to the level of deception
contemplated in Santa Fe. Id. at 665. This holding recognized an appropriate limitation in
the Meridor decision. The Meridor court noted that Rule 10b-5 does not require insiders to
characterize conflict of interest transactions in pejorative terms. 567 F.2d at 218 n.8. To
require disclosure that a transaction is "unfair" in addition to disclosure of the terms of that
transaction would amount to requiring a pejorative characterization. Failure to make such
"disclosure" is not a sufficient claim of deception after Santa Fe. 442 F.2d at 665.
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6, -7, -8, -13 (1977). Rule 10b-6 is the primary antimanipulative
provision. See text accompanying notes 2-11 infra. Rules lOb-7 and lOb-8 govern the permissible scope of stabilizing transactions during securities offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7, -8
(1977). Rule 10b-13 prohibits manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with exchange
or tender offers. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1977); see text accompanying notes 153-157 infra.
2 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-6 (1977). Rule 10b-6 was first proposed on May 18, 1954. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5040 (May 18, 1954) [1952-1956 Transfer Binder] FEn. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 76,294. After being revised in April, 1955, SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 5159 (April 19, 1955) [1952-1956 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
76,339, the Rule finally was adopted on August 15, 1955. SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 5194 (July 5, 1955) [1952-1956 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T
76,350.
The classes of persons covered are underwriters and prospective underwriters, see text
accompanying notes 39-47 infra, issuers or other persons on whose behalf the distribution is
being made, see text accompanying notes 48-96 infra, and brokers and dealers, see text
accompanying notes 96-114 infra.
Neither Rule lOb-6 nor the Securities Exchange Acts define the term "distribution."
The SEC and the courts have thus undertaken this task. See, e.g., Collins Sec. Corp., SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 11,766 (October 23, 1954) [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,327; Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652 (1961); see text accompanying notes 19-37 infra.
I Rule 10b-6 states that such activity shall constitute a "manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance. . .

."

See text accompanying notes 7-18 infra.

6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(3)(i)-(xi) (1977). The Rule does not apply to eleven specified
transactions because those transactions either do not involve manipulative purposes or are
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Section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 provides the
general antimanipulative section upon which Rule 10b-6 is based.8 Of particular importance in understanding the thrust of Rule 10b-6 is the prohibition in section 9(a)(2) of transactions that create "actual or apparent
active trading" in a distributed security. The two-fold purpose of this
prohibition is to protect against the defrauding of unwary investors and to
remove any impediments to a free and open market.' 0 Rule 10b-6 was
designed to codify principles generally followed by the courts and the SEC
in construing section 9 and to define further the phrase "actual and apparent trading activity."" The classic case of manipulation occurs when persons distributing stock drive up the selling price by making purchases in
the market, thereby inducing others to buy at the artificially inflated
2
price.'
necessary to allow the offering to proceed. For example, exception (iv), which permits oddlot transactions by registered odd-lot dealers, and exception (vii), which allows the exercise
of any right or conversion privilege to acquire securities, cannot involve manipulative purposes because the transactions are closely regulated and have fixed prices. See also exceptions
(viii)-(x) (transactions governed by Rules lOb-7, 10b-8, and 10b-2 respectively). Exceptions
(i) and (vi) permit underwriters to purchase from an issuer and to solicit purchasers for the
distributed securities. No offering could ever proceed without these two essential steps.
Exception (iii) allows unsolicited, privately negotiated purchases of a substantial
amount, effected neither on a security exchange nor from or through a broker. The purpose
of this exception is to permit the issuer to acquire securities from a large stockholder to add
to the distributed securities. See Wolfson, Rule I0b-6: The Illusory Search for Certainty, 25
STAN. L. REv. 809, 809-10 n.4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wolfson]; text accompanying notes
53-58 infra. Exception (v) permits brokerage transactions not involving solicitation of the

customer's order. See

PRACICING LAW INSTrrUTE, NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 216-28 (Mundheim, Fleisher & Vandegrift eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as NINTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE].

15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1976). The pertinent part of § 9(a)(2) provides:
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of the mails
or any means. . . of interstate commerce, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, or for any member of a national securities exchange . . .(2) [tjo
effect, alone or with one or more persons, a series of transactions in any security
registered on a national securities exchange creating actual or apparent active
trading in such security or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others...
Section 10(b) of the '34 Act, another general antimanipulative section, prohibits manipulative devices whether in the over-the-counter market or on an exchange in contravention of
the rules of the SEC. Id. at § 78j(b). Thus the scope of Rule 10b-6 extends to both exchange
and over-the-counter markets.
Wolfson, supra note 6, at 809.
See note 7 supra.
Masland, Fernon & Anderson, 9 S.E.C. 338, 344 (1941); see 3 L. Loss, SEcunES
REGULATION 1549-60 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as L. Loss]; REPORT OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES,

S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong.,

2d Sess. 54 (1934).
" SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5194 (July 5, 1955) [1952-1956 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 76,350; Whitney, Rule 10b-6: The Special Study's Rediscovered Rule, 62 MICH. L. REv. 567, 568-72 (1964); see Foshay, Market Activities of Participants in Securities Distributions, 45 VA. L. REv. 907, 918-21, 926-37 (1959).
12 See, e.g., SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 907-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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Section 9(a)(2) identifies the two elements of a prohibited manipulation as a series of transactions 3 coupled with a purpose of inducing others
to purchase or sell a security." Before the adoption of Rule 10b-6, the
courts and the SEC had held that manipulative purposes existed where a
motive to manipulate could be shown.'- Since intent is difficult to prove,
the courts and the SEC usually relied on circumstantial evidence to establish the requisite state of mind in cases of manipulation., Under Rule 10b6, however, purchasing or inducing purchases during a distribution is per
se manipulative without regard to purpose. 7 By defining certain behavior
as per se manipulation, Rule 10b-6 obviates any need for a specific finding
of intent.
The attempt to curb manipulation by use of Rule 10b-6's per se approach has produced difficulties in the application of the Rule. Since the
presence of a distribution makes all unexempted purchases or inducements
to purchase a violation of the Rule, the scope of that term determines the
applicability of the Rule. While neither the 1933's or 1934 Acts defines
distribution, the courts"0 and the SEC2' have struggled to interpret its
meaning. Although at one time the SEC distinguished between registered
and unregistered stock offerings,2 the generally accepted standard is the
11The Commission has held that as few as three purchases constitute a "series." Kidder
Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559, 568 (1945). A single order might also result in a "series of
transactions" if the alleged manipulator knew that the order could not be executed all at one
time. Charles C. Wright, 3 S.E.C. 190, 206-09 (1938), rev'd on other grounds Wright v. SEC
112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940). Furthermore, the Commission has held that transactions are not
limited to purchases and sales but also extend to bids. Gob Shops of America, Inc., 39 S.E.C.
92, 101 (1959); Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 106, 121, 125-26 (1949).
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); L. Loss, supra
note 10, at 1550.
'5 See, e.g., Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc., 30 S.E.C. 106, 124 (1949); The Federal Corp., 25
S.E.C. 227, 231 (1947); Charles C. Wright, 3 S.E.C. 190, 206 (1938).
16An early SEC decision succinctly stated "Since it is impossible to probe into the
depths of a man's mind, it is necessary ... that the finding of manipulative purpose be based
on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence." The Federal Corp., 25 S.E.C. 227, 230
(1947); see SEC v. Torr, 22 F. Supp. 602, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc.,
30 S.E.C. 106, 124 (1949).
'7 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-6(a) (1977); Wolfson, supra note 6, at 810-12.
" See Jaffee & Co. v. SEC, 446 F.2d 387, 391 (2d Cir. 1971). But see text accompanying
notes 31-35 infra.
to 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bb (1976).
0 See, e.g. Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 413 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd 550 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y.

1967).
21 See, e.g., Collins Sec. Corp., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,766 [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,327; Jaffee & Co., 44 S.E.C. 285 (1970); aff'd in
part, vacated in part Jaffee & Co. v. SEC, 446 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1971); Bruns, Nordeman &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 652 (1961).
2 In Jaffee & Co., 44 S.E.C. 285 (1970), the SEC had held that a distribution under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bb (1976), was also a distribution for
Rule 10b-6 purposes. 44 S.E.C. at 288. In Jaffee, a broker was appointed agent for thirty-four
selling stockholders in an offering of about 28% of the outstanding stock of Solitron Corporation. The biggest block involved was registered on a shelf registration by one of the partners
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facts and circumstances test originally formulated by the SEC in Bruns,
Nordeman & Company." The Bruns, Nordeman test is "to be interpreted
in light of the Rule's purposes" and focuses upon the selling efforts utilized
and the magnitude of the offering. 4 This necessarily requires a case by case
determination. The relation of the amount of stock offered to the total
amount outstanding, 25 the amount of "float, ' 2 and the amount of normal
trading volume for that particular security 27 are examined to determine
whether the magnitude of the offering constitutes a distribution. Any extra
sales commission paid to the broker,28 the sales literature employed to
recommend the stock,29 and the number of investors to whom the securities
are offered 30 are the factors used to evaluate the selling effort. Moreover,
in Jaffee & Company. Another broker made purchases on behalf of Jaffee from the appointed
agent. Jaffee argued that a shelf registration, while a distribution under the '33 Act because
the offering was syndicated and under a registration statement, was not a distribution for
Rule 10b-6 purposes. Id. at 288. The SEC maintained, however, that such an offering was a
distribution per se, id. at 288-89, stating only that an offering of stock pursuant to a registration statement is "by its very nature" a 10b-6 distribution. Id. at 288.
Commissioner Smith disagreed with this per se approach, stating that the purpose of the
'33 Act registration was to provide adequate disclosure and not to prevent manipulation. Id.
at 296-97. Forecasting the demise of this per se application of 10b-6 to all registered distributions, Commissioner Smith advocated the position ultimately taken by the SEC in Collins
Sec. Corp. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,766 (Oct. 23, 1975) [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,327; see text accompanying notes 21-35 infra.
- 40 S.E.C. 652 (1961). While the Bruns, Nordeman test was formulated in the context
of an unregistered distribution, the SEC's decision in Collins Sec. Corp. made it applicable
to registered distributions also. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,327 at 85,800.
24 40 S.E.C. at 660.
1 See, e.g., Collins Sec. Corp., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,766 (Oct. 23, 1975)
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,327, at 85,800. In Collins, the
fact that the offering amounted to 30% of the issuer's outstanding stock made the offering
clearly a distribution. Id.
SNINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 203.
27 See, e.g., Collins Sec. Corp., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,766 (Oct. 25, 1975)
11975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,327, at 85,795-96. The SEC
emphasized that the market for the manipulated stock in Collins Sec. Corp. was stagnant
and that only two brokers were entering quotations for the stock. Id. at 85,795. Thus, when
the market for a stock is so inactive, even the trading of a small number of shares will increase
the market price. Id. at 85,796. Trading in a stock that has previously been very inactive such
as in Collins Sec. Corp. is very strong circumstantial evidence of manipulative purpose and
therefore evidence of a distribution for 10b-6 purposes. Id. at 85,799; see text accompanying
notes 21-24 supra and notes 31-35 infra.
11Extra sales commission paid to a broker indicates the increased interest of the issuer
in distributing its stock and provides extra incentive for the broker to accomplish that goal.
Both factors make it more likely that manipulation may occur to further those objectives.

See NINTH

ANNUAL INSTITUTE,

supra note 6, at 202-03; Wolfson, supra note 6, at 820-21.

" See Collins Sec. Corp., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,766 (Oct. 23, 1975) [19751976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,327, at 85,796-97 (letters advertising
warrants sent with prospectus; second notice sent reminded shareholders of expiration date
and urged immediate action; and telephone canvas made of warrant holders); F.S. Johns &
Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7972 (Oct. 10, 1966) [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,410; see NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 202-03; Wolfson,
supra note 6, at 820.
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the presence of any one factor alone may identify a distribution because
that factor 3so greatly differentiates the offering from a normal trading
transaction . '

By focusing on these factors, the Bruns, Nordeman test attempts to
find a distribution in situations where the application of Rule 10b-6 will
serve the antimanipulative purposes for which it was drafted.2 Special
selling efforts identify circumstances where both the temptation and opportunity to manipulate the market exist.3 The use of such a pragmatic
test, however, has led to the infusion of the element of purpose into the
Rule and thus has sacrificed the advantages of a per se application of the
Rule.34 Nevertheless, the Bruns, Nordeman test has the advantages of
precluding arbitrary stifling of bona fide market activity and of allowing
the SEC and the courts to adapt the Rule to manipulative practices in
3 5
novel situations.

The Bruns, Nordeman criteria make Rule 10b-6 distributions difficult
to identify with any certainty because the key is not the existence of some
concrete entity named a distribution but the existence of a substantial
interest in manipulation coupled with trading activity.36 One person's ordinary trading transaction may be another's distribution due to the presence
of an interest to manipulate. 3 By identifying a distribution through factors
that demonstrate a possible motive to manipulate the market, the test
determines which parties are subject to the Rule. When a participant in
an offering of stock acquires sufficient interest to manipulate the market,
the Bruns, Nordeman test identifies a distribution and triggers the application of Rule 10b-6 to that participant.
The first group of persons identified in the Rule as participants in the
distributive process are underwriters36 and "prospective underwriters."39 In
"! The nature of the selling effort appears to be more important than the magnitude of
the offering. For example, the SEC found a distribution in an offering of less than 1%of the
outstanding securities because of the selling effort. SEC v. Electronics Sec. Corp., 217 F.
Supp. 831 (D. Minn. 1963).
u Collins Sec. Corp., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,766 (Oct. 23, 1975) [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,327, at 85,800; Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40
S.E.C. 652, 655 (1961).
" Special selling efforts differentiate the transaction from an ordinary one and indicate
that the persons involved may have a motive to manipulate the market. This is essentially
what the concept of distribution intends to define. See text accompanying notes 23-31 supra.
Wolfson, supra note 6, at 812, 821.
Id. at 812-14, 821.
See Wolfson, supranote 6, at 821; text accompanying notes 23-31 supra.
See Collins Sec. Corp., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,766 (Oct. 23, 1975) [19751976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,327, at 85,800 (dealing in distributed
security by market maker as part of normal activity not a distribution); Scott & Stringfellow,
Inc., (May 10, 1977) [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,232 (no
action letter); text accompanying notes 102-105 infra.
17 C.F.R. 10b-6(c)(1) (1977). An underwriter is an investment company that specializes in the marketing of new issues of securities. The underwriter may act strictly as an agent
of the seller (a "best efforts" underwriting), or may purchase the issue outright and then sell
to the public. Usually a managing underwriter will form a syndicate of underwriters who each
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the competitive bid situation,' an underwriter is subject to the Rule when
he submits a bid to become an underwriter.' In negotiated underwritings,"
an underwriter is subject to the Rule when he reaches an understanding
with the issuer that he will underwrite that particular offering. 3 Under the
specific language of the Rule, a prospective underwriter refers only to a
person "who has reached an understanding with the issuer. . . " and therefore applies only to the managing underwriter.4 Other underwriters may
be subject to the Rule, however, soon after the registration statement is
filed either on the theory that they are broker-dealers who have agreed to
participate 5 or on the theory that the managing underwriter is their
agent.46 Once the other underwriters receive their invitations to participate
and make the business judgment to accept, they should consider themselves subject to the Rule as a practical matter even though they have not
formally accepted by notifying the managing underwriter.
take a portion of the issue. Underwriters receive commissions or a concession off the public
offering price as their compensation. See generally 1 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 159-72;
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,WHEN

CORPORATIONS

Go PUBLIC (C. Israel & G. Duff, Jr. eds. 1962).

n Rule 10b-6 defines a "prospective underwriter" as a "person (i) who has
agreed to submit or has submitted a bid to become an underwriter of securities as
to which the issuer, or other person on whose behalf the distribution is to be made,
has issued a public invitation for bids, or (ii) who has reached an understanding,
with the issuer or other person on whose behalf a distribution is to be made, that
he will become an underwriter, whether or not the terms and conditions of the
underwriting have been agreed upon."
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(c)(2) (1977).
" A competitive bidding situation occurs when a group of underwriters form a syndicate
in order to submit a bid to underwrite. The issuer then awards the issue to the lowest
syndicate bid. 1 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 159-72.
" The members of the underwriting syndicate are subject to Rule 10b-6 when they
submit their bid, and not when the syndicate is formed or when the bid price is agreed upon,
because the Rule contemplates agreement with the issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b(c)(2)(ii)
(1977); see NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 212.
42 In the usual negotiated underwriting, the issuer meets with an underwriter, the underwriter makes a preliminary examination of the issuer, and then the underwriter decides
whether to go ahead with the offering. The exact terms of price and other details are reached
before the effective date of the registration statement. See generally JENNINGS & MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION 23 (4th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as JENNINGS & MARSH].
,317 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(c)(1) (1977). Once the understanding with the issuer is reached,
the underwriter has acquired a significant interest in the price of the issue although he is not
legally committed. The underwriter's interst in the price stems from the fact that his commission is based upon it. In a firm commitment offering, he will be forced to retain any stock he
cannot sell to the public. See Wolfson, supra note 6, at 824-25.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(c)(2)(ii) (1977) (emphasis added).
's Lum's, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 223, 236 (1966); see text accompanying notes 97-117 infra.
, Id.; cf. Hazel Bishop, Inc., 40 S.E.C. 718, 736 (1961) (broker who acted as selling
shareholder's agent is subject to Rule 10b-6).
" An invited underwriter could technically argue that since it has no contractual agreement with the issuer until notification of acceptance, he has no agreement to participate. An
express agreement has not been necessary, however, to find participation in some instances.
See, e.g., Lum's Inc., 43 S.E.C. 223, 236 (1966); Hazel Bishop Inc., 40 S.E.C. 718, 736 (1961).
From a practical viewpoint, the decision to accept should trigger compliance because notification of acceptance is a mere formality. NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 210-12.
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Issuers or other persons on whose behalf a distribution is made are the
second major group of persons subject to Rule 10b-6. 5 Selling shareholders
are covered by the "other persons" language. Since an issuer is usually a
corporation, the SEC staff holds officers, directors and anyone in a control
relationship subject to the Rule although such persons are not specifically
mentioned.49 Further, if the decision to sell is made solely by shareholders
who are officers, directors or control persons of an issuer, the issuer is
nonetheless subject to the Rule on the basis that the control persons'
close relationship with the issuer and the issuer's participation in the
preparation, execution and filing of the registration statement constitutes
participation in the distribution."0
Nevertheless, exemptions are available which enable issuers to make
purchases of their stock even when control persons propose to sell shares
under a shelf registration.-' The SEC has developed standard guidelines
that permit an issuer to trade so long as the issuer's purchase program and
the control persons' sales are harmonized to avoid any distortion of the
market. 2 The staff explained the interplay of these conditions in a recent
no-action letter.53 The SEC stated in the letter that a control person of a
company must notify the company one week before the person is to make
any sales and the company must discontinue all purchases until the seller
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(2) (1977).
4, In 1956, the SEC proposed to amend Rule 10b-6 to extend specifically to officers,
directors and control persons of an issuer. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5415 (Dec. 5, 1956)
[1952-1956 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 76,417. The proposal was never
adopted however. For the SEC position on such persons, see Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F.
Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also SEC v. Resch-Cassin, 362 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co.-, 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (Rule 10b-6 applied to all
officers, directors and control persons of underwriter or other broker-dealer participants in
distribution).
The problem of issuer involvement in a distribution by its officers, directors or other
control persons is another illustration of the issue of whether Rule 10b-6 should be applied
automatically by its language or only to those situations where a manipulative purpose may
be present. See text accompanying notes 19-37 supra. Since the Rule applies to an issuer "on
whose behalf [the] distribution is being made" and to a person "who has agreed to participate," an automatic application of the Rule to the issuer could result whenever control
persons sell a significant amount of stock. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(2)(3) (1977). If the issuer's
involvement or interest in the success of the control persons' offering is analyzed, however,
the Rule could then be more appropriately applied in light of its purpose. See NINTH ANNUAL
INSTrrUTE, supra note 6, at 208-210.
A more difficult question is presented when strangers to the company are effecting sales
under a registration statement prepared and filed by the issuer. See, e.g., Cooper Laboratories, Inc. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) T 81,032 (no-action letter).
However, a similar analysis focusing on the issuer's interest in the stockholder's sales would
prove useful.
5, Exemptions are allowed if the SEC determines that the transaction does not constitute
a manipulative device within the purpose of the Rule pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(f)
(1977).
52 Appendices 1-B and B-6 are included in almost every no-action letter issued by the
Commission. See 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 22,726.11.
Capital Cities Communications, Inc. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,854.
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notifies the company that he will make no further purchases. 5 The thrust
of this requirement is to prevent insiders of a company from selling company stock at a price which has been influenced by company purchases.5
Direct purchases by the company of stock from selling insiders are not
prohibited by the Rule, however, as long as such purchases are not solicited
by the company and are not to the advantage of any insider. Analagous
to this situation is whether large block purchases by the company are also
prohibited. The Commission staff maintains that there is no waiting period
after the insiders' sales are completed 57 and that Rule 10b-6(a)(3)(iii) excepts "unsolicited privately negotiated purchases . . .(of) a substantial
amount .. ."58
The Commission staff also has attempted to apply Rule 10b-6 only if
necessary when confronted with the problem of issuer purchases. In another recent no action letter, 9 the SEC responded to an issuing company
that wanted to purchase its common stock as a defensive maneuver against
a tender offer the company considered to be against the best interests of
its shareholders. The company feared the application of the Rule because
officers and directors had simultaneously proposed to sell 25,000 shares
under a registration statement. 0 While indicating that a secondary offering
by the control persons might constitute a distribution for 10b-6 purposes,'
the small number of shares offered compared to the total outstanding,"2 the
fact that no special effort to sell was to be made, 3 and the fact that the
qualified options currently exercisable covered only a small number of
shares 4 combined to preclude the possibility that purchases by the company would be for manipulative purposes. 5
Issuer purchases of its own stock for employee stock benefit plans also
may be subject to Rule 10b-6 due to the actions of control persons. 6 The
Id. at 87, 258-59. See also 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 22,726.11.
Capital Cities Communications, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FEn. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH)1 80,854, at 87,259.
SId.
Appendix 1-B, 2 FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 22,726.11.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(3)(iii) (1977). The exception is not precluded by the Appendix. Capital Cities Communication, Inc. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,854, at 87,259.
s,Inexco Oil Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 80,943.
Id. at 87,486-87.
6,The Commission staff said the matter was "not free from doubt." Id.
62 The 25,000 shares offered by the control persons were insignificant when compared
with the over 11 million shares of Inexco outstanding. Id.
" No underwriter was employed to sell the shares. Id.
" The options exercisable by the control persons covered only 45,000 shares. Id.
Id. The analysis of factors by the staff in the Inexco letter closely resembles the Bruns,
Nordeman test. See text accompanying notes 21-29 supra.
61Some employee stock plans are automatically excluded from Rule lOb-6 restrictions
by paragraph (e). 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(e) (1977). In order to qualify for the exclusion, the
plan must either meet the requirements of §§ 422 and 423 or § 424(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 or be a plan providing for periodic payments for acquisitions by employees and
periodic purchases by either the employees or the person acquiring the securities for the
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greatest possibility for manipulation in this context arises when a company
is contemplating an exchange or merger offer with another company. Because the exchange formula is a function of the price of the acquiring
company's stock which may be driven up by company purchases of its own
stock, the type of artificial market influence proscribed by Rule 10b-6 is
clearly present. The market price of the stock would then reflect the inflated value caused by the acquiring company's purchases and not the true
7
market value.
The crucial issue in the exchange offer context concerns the point at
which the distribution commences so that the time when the acquiring
company may not make any more purchases can be determined. In
Richland v. Cheatham," the district court confronted this issue only implicitly. The case is important, however, because the terms of that judgment have served as a model for subsequent staff restrictions. The SEC
restrained Georgia Pacific, the acquiring company, from directly or indirectly bidding for or purchasing any Georgia Pacific stock after an agreement in principle had been reached for the acquisition of the target company. Purchases and bids for stock within ten days prior to the time the
market price of Georgia Pacific stock was to be used to determine the
exchange ratio were also prohibited. 70 Georgia Pacific also agreed to disclose the daily volume and prices of purchases made after the commencement of serious negotiations. 7' Because the prohibition on purchases began
when an agreement in principle had been reached, the court and the SEC
implicitly recognized at least this point as the commencement of the distribution.
Subsequent to the Richland judgment, the SEC issued releases which7
further tightened the restrictions on purchases enunciated in Richland. 1
The SEC indicated that the restrictions now commence when a "definite
arrangement" to acquire has been made73 and that the disclosure obligation now arises at "the very beginning of negotiations. '74 Nevertheless,
these disclosure guidelines do not mark the commencement of the distribuemployees. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(e) (1977); cf. Tandy Brands, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,161 (trustees made purchases at sole discretion of
company, plan held not exempt).
'7 See Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).

"Id.
" See, e.g., Lincoln Am. Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,040 (no action letter); MEI Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,855 (no action letter).
70 272 F. Supp. at 151.
71 Id.
72 Genesco, Inc., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,354; Appen-

dix B-6, 2

FED. SEC.

L.

REP.

(CCH)

22,726.11.

Id. A "definite arrangement" may be made earlier than the "agreement in principle"
discussed in Richland v. Cheatham. See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,723 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 542
F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
11Appendix B-6, 2 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 26,726.11.
7
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tion because the disclosure obligation illustrates that such purchases are
permissible, which would not be true if the distribution had commenced. 5
Rather, the "definite arrangement" to acquire the target company marks
76
the commencement of the distribution.
Because many employee stock purchase plans do not satisfy the stringent requirements of paragraph (e) of Rule 10b-6, 7 issuers must frequently
ask the Commission staff for rulings on the application of the Rule to
transactions pursuant to such plans. Many of the restrictions of the
Richland judgment and the principles involved in Rule 10b-6 are well
illustrated by some of the more recent no action letters. The most common
situation in which a company has asked for an exemption has been when
the employee stock plan fails in some minor way to meet the requirements
of Rule 10b-6(e). For example, the plan may have non-qualified, nonrestrictive options held by control persons 7 or the purchases may be controlled by the company and therefore not be periodic. 79 In such situations,
the SEC has granted exemptions because neither the amounts of stock
involved nor the circumstances of the purchase show any manipulative
purpose."0
Nevertheless, company purchases of its own stock for employee plans
often cause Rule 10b-6 problems in more irregular contexts that call for
closer examination of the transactions. Recently, a corporation proposed
to make a cash tender offer for approximately one-fifth of its outstanding
stock.' The company also had an employee stock plan that did not fit the
phragraph (e) exemption because the company retained sole discretion
over the terms and prices at which the stock would be purchased.8 2 The
significant amount of shares involved in the tender offer and the com71 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, EIGHTH ANNUAL INsTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 235

(Mundheim, Fleisher, & Vandegrift, eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE].

"' See Fridrich v. Bradford [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,723 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).

7 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
7 See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T
81,233 (no action letter) (unrestricted stock options); Modem Merchandising, Inc., [19771978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,202 (no action letter) (warrants held by

control persons).
11Uniroyal, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,162 (no
action letter) (company exercises control and influence over purchases); Tandy Brands, Inc.,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,161 (no action letter) (purchases
made at sole discretion of company).

No manipulative purpose is present because either the amount of shares distributed
pursuant to the plan is small as compared to the company's total outstanding shares, see
McDonald's Corp. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,233 (no action
letter), or the distribution to employees is the only one in which the company is engaged, see
Tandy Brands, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,161 (no
action letter).
81 Tandy Corp. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,284 (no action
letter).
" Id. at 88,347.
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pany's unlimited power over employee stock purchases gave the company
both the capability and the temptation to manipulate the market." However, the staff granted a no action position to the company., Following safe
practice, the company had suspended all purchases at the time management determined to submit the tender offer proposal to the company's
board of directors, 8 thereby eliminating any market impact on the shareholder's decision to tender. Other conditions were imposed to insure fairness to the tendering shareholders. 8
Employee plans of this sort often have appointed trustees to make the
purchases of the company's stock for the plan." When the trustee is independent of the company and the trustee and company do not have common
control persons, Rule 10b-6 problems usually do not arise.' When the
company has wholly owned subsidiary broker-dealers, however, any transactions of the subsidiaries in the parent company's stock with the trustee
present 10b-6 issues. The Commission is concerned that a broker-dealer's
professional expertise and proximity to the market for its own securities
afford greater opportunity to affect the market price.89 Therefore, the
SEC's proposed Rule 13e-2 would prohibit an issuer who is also a brokerdealer from purchasing its own securities except through a totally independent agent. 0 In a recent no action letter, the Commission applied similar
reasoning to prevent a wholly owned subsidiary broker-dealer from selling
the issuer parent company's stock to an independent trustee of the company's employee stock purchase plan."' The parent company claimed that
the trustee and the subsidiary conducted arms-length deals, that each had
12See id.; text accompanying notes 21-29 supra.
81Tandy Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

81,284 (no

action letter).
" Id. at 88,349.

N The conditions imposed by the SEC were: (1) appropriate notice to all holders of the
company's common stock; (2) shares of common stock tendered could be withdrawn at any

time until seven days after the offer was published or at any time within sixty days of the
original offer; (3) any increased consideration paid for shares acquired after the offer must
be paid to all who tendered. These conditions are fairly typical of limitations placed on tender
offerors when Rule 10b-6 may be applicable. See, e.g., NICOR, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer

Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,308 (no action letter); Ethyl Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,105 (no action letter).
0 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(e) (1977).
m See, e.g., The Mead Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,307 (no action letter). If the issuer has no control over the trustee's purchases, it has no
capability to manipulate the market. Thus, application of Rule 10b-6 would not further the

Rule's purposes.
" Inter-Regional Fin. Group, Inc. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,042, at 87,757 (no action letter).

" See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10539 (Dec. 6, 1973) [1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,600. Proposed Rule 13e-2 would impose certain limitations on issuer
purchases of their own securities. The proposal includes express provisions for employee stock
plans that exempt such plans from Rule 10b-6. Id. at 83,574. See generally JENNINGS &MARSH,

supra note 42, at 769-778.
" Inter-Regional Fin. Group, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,042 (no action letter).
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separate fiduciary duties, that the broker-dealer subsidiary's customers
would be disserved if they could not trade parent company stock, and that
2
neither the trustee nor the parent company controlled the stock's prices.
The Commission still denied the request, claiming that the purpose of the
independent agent requirement of proposed Rule 13e-2 would be under3
mined if that agent could trade with subsidiaries of the parent company.
While the Commission may have been unduly cautious considering the
many safeguards on the transaction and its valid business purpose,94 the
motive and capability to manipulate the market are present and Rule 10b6 should apply.9
The third category of persons explicitly covered by Rule 10b-6 are brokers and dealers. Under the terms of the Rule, they are subject to its
prohibitions when they have agreed to participate, or are participating,
directly or indirectly, in the distribution." Thus, a broker-dealer 99 is probably subject to the Rule when he solicits his customers and is clearly subject
to the Rule when he accepts his allotment from the underwriter, even if
this occurs prior to the effective date of the offering.99 Acceptance of the
allotment and solicitation of customers demonstrate that the broker-dealer
has committed himself to participate in the distribution. Furthermore, no
express agreement or contractual understanding is necessary to find that
a dealer is a participant in the distribution, as any furthering or facilitating
of the offering will suffice. ' Similarly, a broker-dealer is subject to the
Rule if others place bids for him, 19 ' and the agent who places the bids is
also subject to Rule 10b-6 if he should have known that the traded securi2
ties were being distributed.'1
92

Id. at 87,758-59.

,3 Id. at 87,757.
'1 Besides the arms-length nature of the transaction, the separate fiduciary duties of
trustee and subsidiary, and the company's lack of control over the stock's prices, the company
further demonstrated that the purchases would be made in compliance with certain New York
Stock Exchange rules. Id. at 87,758.
"5 See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10539 (Dec. 6, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,600.
96 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(3) (1977).

27

Id.

"8

There is no practical difference between a "broker" and a "dealer" in the securities

industry. See REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARETs, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,

1st Sess. [pt 1, pp. 17-19] (1963). The term broker-dealer is used in this article to embrace
individual proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations that engage in the business of
effecting' securities transactions with or for the investing public, whether they act as agents
for others or buy and sell for their own accounts, and whether they style themselves brokerage
firms, investment bankers, or securities dealers.
", Wolfson, supra note 6, at 877.
,00Id.; see, e.g., SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 908-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
In Scott Taylor, a broker was held to have violated Rule 10b-6 based upon the fact that he
knew that the securities he supplied to Scott Taylor would be offered and distributed. The
court held that the broker thereby facilitated and furthered the distribution. Id.
,01Causing others to place bids for the broker-dealer would be covered by the "indirectly
bids for" language of Rule 10b-6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(3) (1977).
"I See Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967). In Dlugash, the agent, Douglas
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Because market makers' 3 buy and sell securities during a distribution
to maintain a liquid market and facilitate the offering, they are subject to
0
Rule 10b-6 if they are deemed to be participating in a distribution.' ' Under
the SEC's prior view that any shelf registered offering was a distribution
for 10b-6 purposes, any person who traded the securities covered by the
5
registration statement was a participant and subject to the Rule.' As a
shelf
which
by
a
means
as
result, sales to market makers were excluded
6
in
opinion
The
Commission's
offered.'
registration securities might be
07
of
distribution
application
per
se
the
overruling
Collins Securities Corp.,'
to securities sold under a registration statement, however, gave helpful
guidance to permissible market making activities. The Collins opinion,
while not specifically discussing the scope of the term "participation",
concluded that a market maker's normal trading activities in distributed
stock are not prohibited by the Rule.' 8 This conclusion implicitly recogEnterprises, was to place quotations for another broker-dealer, F.S. Johns & Company, at
prices dictated by F.S. Johns. Douglas claimed it was unaware of any manipulative scheme,
but the court noted that Douglas knew there was no demand for the stock and that rapidly
rising prices in the absence of demand are well-known symptoms of unlawful market activity.
Such facts put Douglas on notice that a distribution was in progress. Id. at 109-10.
"I A market maker is a broker-dealer who quotes both a bid and asked price, and stands
ready either to buy or sell as principal in reasonable quantities. The readiness of firms to
make a continuous market is essential to the existence of a liquid stock market. Wolfson,
supra note 6, at 815 n.34; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-9(f)(1) (1977).
" Market makers, if deemed to be participating in the distribution by selling the offered
securities, could not purchase those same securities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1977); see Wolfson, supra note 6, at 817.
'0 Jaffee & Co., 44 S.E.C. 285 (1970); aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Jaffee & Co. v. SEC,
446 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1971). In Jaffee, a market maker was held to have violated Rule 10b-6
by its purchase of 25,000 of the 107,700 shares offered from another broker-dealer who had
been appointed exclusive agent for the selling shareholders. The market maker had not agreed
to participate and claimed that its transactions were part of its normal trading activities. 44
S.E.C. at 288. The Commission, however, held that the market maker was aware of the
distribution because it had received a prospectus from the appointed agent and thus violated
Rule 10b-6 by its transactions. Id. at 290.
In dissent, Commissioner Smith correctly noted that to require any market maker who
buys shares covered by a registration statement to withdraw from sales would unnecessarily
disrupt the trading market. Id. at 298. If the Rule is applied in light of its purposes, see text
accompanying notes 21-29 supra, there is no reason to prohibit normal trading transactions
where no manipulative purposes exist. 44 S.E.C. at 298. Commissioner Smith's position was
ultimately accepted in Collins Sec. Corp. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,327.
' NINTH ANNUAL INsTrrUTE, supra note 6, at 213. In response to a request for a no action
position, the Commission staff outlined four methods by which shelf registered securities
might be sold: (1) directly by the broker-dealer to its customers; (2) through a syndication of
underwriters; (3) by a placemeht of bid wanted soliciations in the pink sheets; (4) by sales
under Rule 144 after the registration becomes stale. All these eliminate the purchase end of
the broker-dealer's market making functions. See Siliconix, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,327.
'1 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,766 (Oct. 23, 1975), [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
80,327.
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
I The Commission stated in Collins that it would unnecessarily disrupt the market and
extend the restrictions of 10b-6 beyond their purpose to prohibit such activity. Id. at 85,800.
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nized that a market maker does not participate in the stock's distribution.
In a recent letter, the staff declined to give a no action position to a market
maker because its sales might constitute a distribution, but did state that
sales by a dealer which are part of his usual and customary market making
activities are not generally viewed by the SEC as involvement in a distribution.1 0
Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan"' further illustrates the scope
of the term "participation" in 10b-6 as it relates to market makers. The
market maker in Byrnes attempted to rescind a sale when it found that
the shares were covered by a registration statement."' The district court
found that the market maker was not participating in the offering and thus
did not fall within Rule 10b-6 prohibitions.1 1 2 The court based this finding
by focusing on the nature and extent of the particular market maker's role
rather than the nature of the offering in general.13 While the court found
that a distribution was in progress, it held that the market maker did not
participate in that distribution because the number of shares involved
were a very small percentage of the total registered shares, and the market
maker's purchase was in the ordinary course of its business."'
The Collins and Byrnes opinions stand for the proposition that a market maker will not automatically be deemed a participant in a distribution
solely because the shares are covered by a registration statement. This
application of a facts and circumstances test to determine the scope of the
individual's participation is consistent with the Rule's application in other
situations."'
Rule 10b-6 can accomplish its antimanipulative objectives without inadvertently obstructing bona fide market activity if the Rule is applied
when the facts and circumstances indicate that a transaction contains
possible opportunities to manipulate the market. The recent letters and
cases discussed illustrate that a flexible application of Rule 10b-6 achieves
greater effectiveness and simultaneously does not unduly restrict legitimate business transactions in the securities market.
'°0 Scott & Stringfellow, Inc. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,232.
110413 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affl'd, 550 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1977).
"1 413 F. Supp. at 467. The market maker feared the impact of Jaffe & Co., 44 S.E.C.
285 (1970). See note 106 supra.
,12413 F. Supp. at 472.
"
Id. at 471.
"' The Byrnes court, by focusing on the magnitude of the offering, applied the Bruns,
Nordeman test to determine whether the market maker participated in the distribution. See
text accompanying notes 23-37 supra. When the focus is on the individual's actions rather
than on the offering in general, the Bruns, Nordeman test is helpful in distinguishing the
transaction from an ordinary one and to determine whether Rule 10b-6 should apply. See 413
F. Supp. at 471; text accompanying notes 32-37 supra.
I' See text accompanying notes 50-95 supra.
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While there has been comparatively little litigation concerning private
rights of action under the antimanipulative provisions of Rule 10b-6, two
recent district court decisions may foreshadow an increase in interest on
the standing issue.
In Halle & Stieglitz Filor, Bullard, Inc. v. Empress International,
Ltd.,," the defendant counterclaimed for violations of Rules 10b-6 and 10b7, "7but the district court applied a purchaser-seller requirement to private
actions under Rule 10b-6 and found that the defendant did not meet that
requirement."8 In Warren v. Bokum Resources Corp.,'" the district court
implied a private right of action under Rule 10b-13111 in favor of persons
who had tendered their securities pursuant to a tender offer by Bokum. 2 '
Examination of both these cases in light of the recent Supreme Court
decision in Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries, Irc.", demonstrates the major
issues involved in determining whether and in whose favor standing exists
under the antimanipulative rules.
In Empress, the plaintiffs publicly offered Empress stock as underwriters and then traded actively in the stock during the distribution.' The
court never reached the issue of whether Halle & Stieglitz's actions violated Rule 10b-6, but summarily dismissed Empress' claim for lack of
standing.2 4 The court based this determination on its findings that Empress did not purchase or sell, but only held the stock. The Empress court
applied the purchaser-seller requirement,'2 originally applied in Rule 10b5 private actions, 21 as a prerequisite for maintenance of a 10b-6 private
action. ' 2 The purchaser-seller limitation requires that the plaintiff allege
" 442 F. Supp. 217 (D. Del. 1977); see text accompanying notes 123-36 infra.
, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7 (1977).
442 F. Supp. at 226-27.
"' 433 F. Supp. 1360 (D.N.M. 1977); see text accompanying notes 174-207 infra.
,2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1977); see text accompanying notes 167-70 infra.
,21
433 F. Supp. at 1367-68.
'22
430 U.S. 1 (1977).
'= 442 F. Supp. at 226. Halle & Stieglitz commenced a public offering of Empress stock
"

as underwriters on May 3, 1972. All of the stock was not ultimately distributed, however, and
large amounts were returned to Halle & Stieglitz. From May 3 to May 9, 1972, Halle &
Stieglitz engaged in stabilization transactions in Empress stock but failed to file the reports
required by Rule 10b-7. Between May 9 and October, 1972, Halle & Stieglitz participated in
the distribution of Empress stock and also purchased and sold the stock. Id. Empress alleged
Rule lOb-6 and Rule 10b-7 violations. The court did not distinguish the Rules in its discussion
of the standing issue because of its analysis of their common statutory origins. See text
accompanying notes 134-36 infra.
U 442 F. Supp. at 226-27.
"' The purchaser-seller requirement was first formulated by the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). In
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Supreme Court firmly
established the purchaser-seller requirement as a limitation on the class of plaintiffs entitled
to sue under Rule 10b-5. See text accompanying notes 129-35 infra.
12 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977); see note 125 supra.
2 422 F. Supp. at 226-27.
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that he suffered the claimed injury in connection with his purchase or sale
of a security. 12
The Empress court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores'25 to impose the purchaser-seller limitation
on persons who can sue for Rule 10b-6 violations. In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court posed three principal justifications for the purchaser-seller
requirement. The Court relied on the longstanding judicial acceptance of
the requirement,'30 the fact that the requirement conforms to the statutory
language and legislative history of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 13 and the danger of vexatious litigation should the requirement be removed. 32 The Empress court justified the imposition of the
purchaser-seller limitation to Rule 10b-6 actions principally because of the
limitation's conformity with the language and legislative history of section
10(b). 3 Under section 10(b), no person may use, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security, any manipulative or deceptive device in
contravention of rules promulgated by the SEC.13 Congress' failure to
amend the language "in connection with the purchase or sale" in section
10(b) persuaded the Blue Chip Court to affirm the applicability of the
purchaser-seller requirement to actions under Rule 10b-5. 35
While recognizing that the purchaser-seller requirement derived from
Rule 10b-5 cases and that the Supreme Court's affirmance of that requirement was also in the context of Rule 10b-5, the Empress court noted that
the Blue Chip opinion indicated that the purchaser-seller requirement
applies generally to section 10(b) .13 The Empress court held that the
purchaser-seller requirement is applicable to Rule 10b-6 because that Rule
also derives its statutory authority from section 10(b) .17Since Empress
"2

Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952).

1- 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
' The Court noted that the purchaser-seller requirement had been upheld by virtually
all of the reported cases considering the limitation. Id. at 731-33.
" Id. at 733-36. The Court emphasized that several provisions of the Securities Acts
provide express remedies for nonpurchasers/sellers. Id. at 733-34.
32 Id. at 737-49. The Supreme Court in Blue Chip offered the following policy justifications for retaining the purchaser-seller requirement: (1) the potential for vexatious "strike"
suits arising out of the fact that a Rule lOb-5 action may have great settlement value to a
plaintiff and may thus disrupt normal business activity absent limits that allow for dismissal;
(2) the possibility for abuse of discovery rules in such suits; (3) the guidance that an objectively demonstrable fact of a sale transaction affords triers of fact in Rule 10b-5 cases beyond
the plaintiff's testimony as to what he would have done in the absence of the alleged fraud.

Id.
13 442 F. Supp. at 227.

134
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
421 U.S. at 732-33.
'' 442 F. Sfpp. at 227. The Empress court relied on the passage in Blue Chip that cites
Congress' failure to amend § 10(b). See 421 U.S. at 732-33. The SEC had requested Congress
to amend the language of § 10(b) to bar fraud in connection with "any attempt" to purchase
or sell any security. However, Congress has not amended the section which only prohibits
fraud in connection with an actual purchase or sale. 442 F. Supp. at 227, citing 421 U.S. at
732-33.
"3 442 F. Supp. at 227.
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International held but did not purchase or sell their shares, the court found
that the company lacked standing to claim damages for Rule 10b-6 violations. "'
In Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries, Inc.,' 9 the Supreme Court strongly
suggested that a purchaser-seller limitation is applicable to potential
plaintiffs under Rule 10b-6 private actions. Because of the posture of the
case, the Supreme Court did not fully resolve the standing issue' and
most of the analysis presented is either dicta or based on unchallenged
SEC interpretations. However, the Court's discussion of Chris-Craft's
standing to sue Bangor Punta Corp. for alleged violations of Rule 10b-6 is
still instructive.
Both Bangor Punta and Chris-Craft sought control of Piper Aircraft Co.
by use of competing tender offers. After Bangor Punta was victorious,
Chris-Craft sued Bangor Punta for alleged violations of the securities
laws.' The Second Circuit held that Chris-Craft had standing to sue for
damages resulting from Rule 10b-6 violations,4 2 but the Supreme Court
reversed, holding instead that Chris-Craft's complaint was beyond the
43
concerns of Rule 10b-6.
As one of its reasons for not fully resolving the Rule 10b-6 standing
issue, the Court in Piper stated that the Court of Appeals below did not
have the benefit of the Blue Chip decision when it decided the case.' This
"I Id. The Empress court also cited Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616, 623 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), in which the district court held that Rule 10b-6 was designed to protect purchasers of
securities. The court in Weitzen denied standing to stockholders of a corporation in a suit
against the directors because the stockholders had not purchased the distributed securities.
Id.

430 U.S. 1 (1977).

14

Id. at 44-45.

For a complete history of the contest for corporate control and the eight years of
protracted litigation in the Piper case, see id. at 4-21.
112480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The Second Circuit held that
Chris-Craft had standing to sue even though Chris-Craft had not purchased the manipulated
stock of Bangor Punta Corp. 480 F.2d at 379. Chris-Craft did not compalin that it was misled
or defrauded by Bangor Punta's illegal purcases, but rather that these purchases misled Piper
shareholders into accepting the Bangor Punta exchange offer and that Chris-Craft, as a rival
for Piper stock, was thereby injured. Id. at 378. The Supreme Court held that such a complaint was outside the concern of Rule 10b-6 and thus denied Chris-Craft standing. 430 U.S.
at 46; see text accompanying notes 150-52 infra.
The Second Circuit did not apply the purchaser-seller limitation to Rule 10b-6 because
no "purchase or sale" language is found in Rule 10b-6. The Second Circuit reasoned that the
requirement evolved from Rule 10b-5's reference to purchase or sale and thus was applicable
only to Rule lOb-5 private actions. 480 F.2d at 378. The Second Circuit also took a broad view
of the purpose of Rule 10b-6 to support its holding. Rather than limiting Rule 10b-6's purpose
to protection of purchasers, the court found that the Rule is designed to promote fairness in
contests for corporate control. Id. at 378. Chris-Craft was entitled to sue for violations of Rule
lOb-6 that infringed its right to a fair contest. Id. at 378-79. The Supreme Court rejected this
broad interpretation, holding instead that Rule 10b-6 protects only purchasers and sellers.
430 U.S. at 45-46; see text accompanying notes 149-51 infra.
'

'1

430 U.S. at 45-46.

'" Id. at 44.
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reference to Blue Chip strongly suggests that the Supreme Court recognized the applicability of the purchaser-seller requirement to Rule 10b-6
private actions. 5 Such a position also can be inferred from the Court's
discussion of the statutory origin of Rule 10b-6 in Piper. The Court noted
the "close relationship" between section 9 of the '34 Act"' and Rule 10b6, and found that section 9 provided an express cause of action in favor of
any person who purchases or sells any security at a price affected by unlawful market activity. " 7 The language of section 9 focuses on the amount
actually paid by an investor for stock affected by manipulation. " ' Because
Chris-Craft complained of lost opportunity for control of Piper, and not
that it paid an unfair price, Chris-Craft's complaint was "beyond the
bounds of the specific concern of Rule 10b-6."'19 By denying standing to
Chris-Craft on this basis,' 0 the Court implicitly recognized that relief
would be available to an investor who asserts that the price paid in his
transaction was affected by Rule 10b-6 violations. Such emphasis on price
necessarily requires that the plaintiff have purchased or sold the affected
security and thus implies a purchaser-seller limitation on Rule 10b-6 plain-

tiffs.
Bangor Punta's purchases of Piper stock during the exchange offer were
"' Since Blue Chip sustained the purchaser-seller requirement for private actions under
Rule 10b-5, the Piper Court's reference to Blue Chip indicates that it viewed the reasoning
in Blue Chip as applicable to Rule 10b-6.
24 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1976).
' 430 U.S. at 46.
' Id. The Court's reasoning that § 9 focuses on the price of the affected security suggests

that damages allowed for Rule 10b-6 private actions may be limited to the pecuniary loss
suffered as a result of the violations. The Court did not discuss the issue of what the proper
measure of damages would be in a successful action under Rule 10b-6. The Court's emphasis
on the price paid, however, would seem to favor recovery of the difference between the fair
market value of the securities at the time of the violation and the actual consideration paid.
This out-of-pocket theory is the most common measure of damages under Rule 10b-6. Ross
v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Another possible measure of damages is the
difference between what the seller received and the fair value of what he would have received
had there been no fraudulent or deceptive conduct. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972). See generally Jacobs, The Measure of Damages Under Rule 10b-5,
65 GEO. L. Rav. 1093 (1977).
"1 430 U.S. at 45.
15 By denying Chris-Craft standing to sue because its complaint was concerned with lost
opportunity for control, the Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's position that Rule
10b-6's purpose includes assuring fairness in corporate control contests. The Second Circuit
cited a SEC release as authority for its view of the purpose of Rule 10b-6 in a tender offer
context. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8595 (May 5, 1969) [1969-70 Transfer
Binder] FaD. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 77,706. The "fairness" referred to in that release probably
meant fairness to the tendering shareholders, insuring that the offeror would not pay a
different consideration to some tendering shareholders than others. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8712 (Oct. 8, 1969) [1969-70 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 77,745; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9395 (Nov. 24, 1971) [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] FEn. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 78,417. Thus, the Supreme Court's narrower
view of Rule 10b-6's purpose appears more sound than the Second Circuit's, especially since
§ 14(e) of the Williams Act was designed to regulate tender offers. 430 U.S. at 22-42; see 15
U.S.C. § 78(n)(e) (1970).
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regulated by Rule 10b-6 when the alleged violations occurred. Besides
prohibiting participants in a distribution from purchasing any distributed
stock, Rule 10b-6 also prohibits the purchase of "rights to purchase" such
stock. 15' The position of the SEC is that the stock of the target company
in an exchange offer constitutes rights to purchase the acquiring company's stock and thus purchases of target-stock outside the exchange offer
are prohibited. 5 2 Rule 10b-13153 now expressly covers tender offers and
exchange offers, and the SEC maintains that the Rule, as applied to exchange offers, is a codification of interpretations of Rule 10b-6 as it applied
to exchange offers."' Thus, Rule 10b-13 prohibits any person who makes a
tender offer or exchange offer from purchasing either securities of the target company or of the acquiring company. 55 The central purpose behind
Rule 10b-13's codification of the SEC's interpretation of Rule 10b-6 appears to be to insure fair treatment of all stockholders of the target company."'6 Because of this close relationship between Rules 10b-6 and 10b13, any analysis of standing under Rule 10b-13 is particularly relevant to
Rule 10b-6 private actions.
The right of private parties to sue for violations of Rule 10b-13 was
analyzed fully in Warren v. Bokum Resources Corp.157 In Warren, Bokum
Resources Corp. sent a tender offer and exchange offer to the plaintiffs.
After the plaintiffs tendered their shares pursuant to the offers, they alleged violations of Rule 10b-13.111 The defendants moved to dismiss the
Rule 10b-13 claim on the ground that no private action may be implied
under the Rule. The district court denied the motion, holding that a private remedy was proper 5 ' for reasons similar to those advanced by the
Supreme Court in other private action cases.6 0 The Warren decision also
parallels the Supreme Court's approach to Rule 10b-6 standing issues in
6
Piper.''
The court in Warren applied the Cort v. Ash"' test to determine
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(2) (1977).
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8595 (May 5, 1969) [1969-70 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,706.
' 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1977).
"' SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8595 (May 5, 1969) [1969-70 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,706. But see Lowenfels, Rule 10b-13, Rule 10b-6 And
Purchasesof Target Company SecuritiesDuringAn Exchange Offer, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1392,
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfels].
I'17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-13 (1977).
1-4Certain substantial holders of target stock are prevented from receiving greater consideration for their shares than lesser stockholders receive. Lowenfels, supranote 154, at 1395.
"'

:52

'
433 F. Supp. 1360 (D.N.M. 1977).
" Id. at 1363.
i' Id. at 1366-67.
"' See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
"1 430 U.S. at 42-46; see text accompanying notes 139-156 supra.
18Z 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort v. Ash, the plaintiffs alleged that the directors of Bethlehem Steel Corp. had violated a federal election campaign contribution law. The plaintiffshareholders sought damages on behalf of the corporation, contending that a derivative cause
of action for shareholders could be implied under the relevant statute. The Supreme Court
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whether a private right of action could be implied from Rule 10b-13. In
Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court held that in order to determine if a federal
statute implies a private cause of action, a court must decide whether the
plaintiff is a member of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted," 3 whether the statute indicates any explicit or implicit legislative
intent either to deny or create a private action, 1 4 whether an implied cause
of action would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme," 5 and whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law."'
The origin and purpose of the statute must be examined to discover
whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted."7 Relying on an SEC release that accompanied
the adoption of Rule 10b-13,"' s the Warren court found that the Rule was
enacted expressly to protect investors and to safeguard the interests of
persons who have tendered their securities in response to a tender or exheld that such a remedy would be improper because the statute showed no concern for
individuals in the plaintiff's position, id. at 78-83, the legislative history suggested no congressional intent to vest in shareholders a federal right to damages, id. at 82-84, a private remedy
would not further the purpose of the statute, id. at 84, and the cause of action was one
traditionally relegated to state law. Id. at 84-85. Although Cort v. Ash concerned the implication of a private right from a criminal statute, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
have held that the analysis is applicable to civil statutes as well. See Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 37-42; Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir.
1977); Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Michigan Dist. Council No. 77
of AFSCME v. City of Detroit, 436 F. Supp. 858, 861-63 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Sullivan v.
Chase Inv. Serv., 434 F. Supp. 171, 179-84 (N.D. Cal. 1977). See generally McMahon &
Rodos, JudicialImplication of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisaland Retrenchment, 80
DICK L. REv. 167 (1976); Mowe, Federal Statutes and Implied Private Actions, 55 ORE. L.
Rsv. 3 (1976); Comment, Implying Private Causes of Action From FederalStatutes: Amtrak
and Cort Apply the Brakes, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. -Rav. 53 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Implying Private Causes of Action].
11 422 U.S. at 78.
"I4Id. The distinction between whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted and whether there is any legislative intent to create
or deny a remedy is difficult to perceive. In fact, these two tests essentially may be alternative
ways for the plaintiff to show that a private cause of action would be consistent with legislative intent. Implying Private Causes of Action, supra note 162, at 62-63; see text accompanying notes 176-79 infra.
10 The reason usually advanced to support the third part of the Cort v. Ash test is that
courts should pay deference to legislative intent and not engage in "judicial legislation." See
Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972); Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285, 291 (1963). Further, if a statutory scheme of enforcement
is ineffective to achieve the statute's purpose, implied private rights of action are desirable
as a matter of policy. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964); see Note, The
Implication of a Private Cause of Action Under Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 47 S. CAL. L. Rav. 383, 411 (1974).
I" The fourth component of the Cort v. Ash test illustrates the Supreme Court's concern
for the interests of federalism. 422 U.S. at 78.
187
"

Id.

SEC Securities Exchange Release No. 8712 (Oct. 8, 1969) [1969-70 Transfer Binder]

FED. SEaC. L. REP. (CCH)

77,745.
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change offer.'"' The plaintiffs in Warren were investors who had so tendered their securities. Thus, the court concluded that they were clearly in
the class for whose "especial benefit" Rule 10b-13 was adopted. 0
The second inquiry necessary under the Cort v. Ash test concerns
whether any implicit or explicit legislative intent to create or deny a private remedy exists.'7' The Warren court noted that while Rule 10b-13 does
not explicitly create a private remedy, the SEC gave no indication that it
did not intend to create such a right of recovery.'7 2 The court then relied
on language in Cort v. Ash stating that in situations where a statute clearly
grants rights to a certain class of persons, a showing of express intent to
create a private cause of action is unnecessary.' Such reasoning must
assume that the creation of a class of rights for certain persons automatically implies the requisite intent.'74 Since Rule 10b-13 gives persons who
tender their securities the right to be assured that the offeror will not
purchase on different terms elsewhere, the Warren court concluded that a
demonstration of intent to create a remedy was unnecessary.'
This analysis by the district court merges the second inquiry of Cort v.
Ash into the first inquiry when no legislative intent to create or deny a
remedy can be demonstrated.'76 Determining whether the relevant statute
has granted a class of persons certain rights necessitates essentially the
same inquiry as determining whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of an "especial class."' 77 The second inquiry would only become relevant
if an "especial class" was found but the statute evidenced an intent to deny
a private cause of action. Such a negative intent would control.7 8 Unless
an "especial class" and a "clear grant of certain rights" can be differentiated, the first and second tests are alternative ways for a plaintiff to show
that the implication of a private right in his favor would be consistent with
legislative intent.' 9
The Warren court buttressed its finding that such a right would be
consistent with the legislative intent by drawing a parallel between Rule
10b-13 and section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.80 Because
section 14(a) has among its chief purposes the "protection of investors,"
,69433 F. Supp. at 1366.

Id., citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
422 U.S. at 78.
'" 433 F. Supp. at 1366-67.
'" Id. at 1367.
",
''

'' The assumption that the creation of a class of rights for certain persons automatically
implies a private right, however, would be defeated if an explicit intent to deny such a private

right is shown. 422 U.S. at 82.
,, 433 F. Supp. at 1367.
See text accompanying notes 163-164 infra.
Implying Private Causes of Action, supra note 162, at 62.
,,' 422 U.S. at 82. If the plaintiff is a member of the protected class and the statute
already provides private remedies, the remedies created by the statute are exclusive. National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
'- See Implying Private Causes of Action, supra note 162, at 62.
Im 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
','

"7
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the Supreme Court implied a right to the availability of a private right of
judicial relief.'8' The Warren court concluded that since Rule 10b-13 was
also enacted for the protection of investors, judicial relief was similarly
appropriate.'82
The third relevant factor under the Cort v. Ash analysis is whether an
implied remedy would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the
statute.'" Reasoning that the threat of damages against a tender offeror
would provide additional protection for the investor, that any damages
awarded would benefit those investors intended to be protected, and that
the remedy would be available only to the protected class,", the Warren
court concluded that allowing a private right would further the purpose of
Rule lOb-13.' 8 5 Such reasoning appears sound when compared to the Supreme Court's treatment of this third factor in Piper.'8
The final inquiry under the Cort v. Ash test is whether the cause of
action is one "traditionally relegated to state law." '87 The Warren court
concluded that resort to state law would not protect the interests Rule 10b13 was intended to safeguard, ' noting the comprehensive federal legislation in this area and the major role played the SEC in securities regula'
tion. 89
Since no comparative state statutory or common law prohibits the
purchase of target securities outside a tender or exchange offer, no state
"I J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
181433 F. Supp. at 1367. An analysis similar to that applied by the Warren court with
respect to Rule 10b-13 would also be appropriate to determine whether a private right is
implied in Rule 10b-6. The purpose of Rule 10b-6 is to eradicate manipulation that would
create an unjustifiable impression of market activity and consequent higher prices. SEC v.
Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Thus, the Rule protects purchasers of distributed securities from buying at artificially high prices. Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F.
Supp. 616, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Rule 10b-6 can be viewed as protecting purchasers (the especial class) and assuring these
purchasers that the price paid for a distributed security is not the product of prohibited
market manipulations. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 45-46; Weitzen v.
Kearns, 271 F. Supp. at 623; Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. at 280.
422 U.S. at 78.
"u The Warren court's enumeration of factors that demonstrate the consistency of an
implied right of action with Rule 10b-13's purposes are relevant to a similar inquiry under
Rule 10b-6. The threat that damages might be assessed against the participant in a distribution would provide additional protection for investors, a major purpose of the statute. See
note 138 supra. If a purchaser-seller limitation is applied to Rule 10b-6 actions as suggested
by Empress and Piper,see text accompanying notes 122-148 supra, then the remedy would
be available only to the protected class and any damages awarded would benefit those intended to be protected. Cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 422 U.S. at 39 (remedy for
defeated tender offeror inappropriate because damage award would not benefit protected
class nor would remedy be available to persons within protected class).
433 F. Supp. at 1367.
IM 422 U.S. at 39. The Supreme Court in Piper held that a private remedy for defeated
tender offerors like Chris-Craft would not be consistent with the Williams Act's purpose of
protecting target shareholders. Id.
422 U.S. at 78.
433 F. Supp. at 1367.
IId.

